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It is widely believed that with the right economic incentives, electrification of transport can significantly 
reduce CO2 emissions by 2050. Estimates of future emissions from car transport tend, though, to ignore 
technological change in electricity generation and bounded rationality of consumers. In this article we 
address these two shortcomings by developing a novel approach that captures the dynamic interdependence 
between the car industry and electricity generation. We assess how incorporating realistic behaviors affects 
estimates of emissions from passengers cars in four models of vehicle adoption, namely with rational, 
myopic, habit-oriented and loss-aversive consumers. This is then combined with three behavioral models 
of travel distance, describing rational, habitual and loss-averse drivers. In the electricity sector, 
technological change occurs through installation of new power plants embodying different energy 
technologies. This allows us to study the impact of policies promoting renewable energy on the price of 
electricity, and indirectly on the rate of adoption of electric cars. The findings indicate that substituting 
renewable energy for fossil fuels in electricity generation by 2050 can triple the electricity price. This 
undermines the positive effect of subsidies on electric car adoption, with the specific effect depending on 
particular behaviors assumed to hold. In addition, we show that myopic and loss-averse consumers buy on 
average less fuel-efficient cars than rational agents. Habitual drivers tend to commute larger distances than 
rational ones, as they do not adjust their behavior optimally to changes in fuel prices and improvements in 
fuel efficiencies. These behavioral effects contribute to the rebound effect. Our findings indicate that 
vehicle choice and driving under rational behavior generate consistently the lowest estimates of life-cycle 
emissions. By ignoring more realistic behaviors consistent with bounded rationality, current studies 





1. Introduction  
Addressing climate change requires a radical transformation of the transport system. To illustrate, it is 
responsible for 25% of total emissions in the European Union (EPRS, 2015). In this context, the diffusion 
of electric vehicles is a high priority for policymakers. Electrification of transport is expected to reduce CO2 
emissions as it eases gasoline-dependency while it also improves local air quality. However, depending on 
the location, electric vehicles may be currently more detrimental to the environment than petrol-powered 
vehicles because of the pollution created in the process of generating electricity (Holland et al., 2016). A 
recent study shows that even within a specific location, emissions from electric cars vary up to 22% due to 
spatial and temporal variations in the temperature, which affects vehicle efficiency and charging duration 
(Yuksel and Michalek, 2015). Moreover, the emissions from car transport depend on the rate of market 
penetration of electric and fuel-efficient vehicles, and how consumers adjust their driving behavior to 
changes in fuel prices. Existing studies adopt a simplified model of rational choice to study future emissions 
from the transport sector (Michalek et al., 2011; Kasten et al., 2016; Miotti et al., 2016; Holland et al., 
2016). This is surprising given a number of behavioral anomalies that have been identified in the literature 
to affect car choice and driving behavior (Busse et al., 2013; Garcia-Sierra et al., 2015; Gossling and 
Metzler, 2017). 
In this paper, we study how incorporating realistic behaviors about purchase and use of electric and 
conventional cars affects estimates of their life-cycle emissions. For this purpose, we develop a novel 
framework that captures the dynamic interdependence between the electricity sector and the car industry. 
The framework combines four elements: an econometric analysis of fuel economies of new cars in Germany 
between 2010-2015; a life-cycle analysis of emissions from conventional and electric cars; discrete choice 
models of vehicle adoption and driving that incorporate realistic behaviors; and a model of the electricity 
sector. The parameters describing the electricity market are tailored to the data from the German electricity 
market. We focus on Germany, as it constitutes an interesting case study, because of the country’s ambitious 
climate change and renewable energy targets. 
Formally, we study total emissions from car transport in four models of vehicle adoption, namely 
with rational, myopic, habit-oriented and loss-aversive consumers. This is then combined with three 
behavioral models of travel distance, namely with rational, habitual and loss-averse drivers. In total, our 
design gives rise to 4x3=12 different combination of behavioral models of car choice and driving. This 
allows us to systematically compare how different types of boundedly-rational behaviors affect emissions 
from car transport. We find that the rational model of vehicle choice and driving generates consistently the 
lowest estimates of future emissions. As a result, if behavioral models are closer to the truth, current models 
may underestimate future emissions, and generate ineffective policy advice. For instance, we show that 
myopic and loss-averse consumers on average buy less fuel-efficient cars than rational agents. In turn, 
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habitual drivers tend to commute larger distances than rational ones as they do not adjust their behavior 
promptly to changes in fuel prices and improvements in fuel efficiencies. Finally, we show that the 
probability of the rebound effect differs substantially between alterative behavioral models of car choice 
and driving, and discuss policy implication of these findings.  
Our paper relates to the burgeoning literature on how the myopia of consumers affects car purchases 
and driving behavior. In particular, much attention has been devoted to the question of whether consumers 
undervalue future gasoline prices when they make car purchase decisions (Kilian and Sims, 2006; Sallee et 
al., 2009; Allcott and Wozny, 2014). Formally, such studies examine how the distribution of cars, 
characterized by different fuel economies, adjust to variations in gasoline prices (Kahn, 1989; Kilian and 
Sims, 2006; Salee et al., 2009). For instance, the analysis of car purchasing data indicates that consumers 
are indifferent between $1 in the discounted gasoline cost and $0.76 in the vehicle purchase price, which 
supports that they undervalue future fuel expenses when buying a car (Allcott and Wozny, 2014). In turn, 
Kilian and Sims (2006) show that not only car prices under-adjust to changes in the price of gasoline, but 
also that the increases in the price of gasoline have a relatively strong effect on used automobile prices 
while decreases do not, contrary to the assumptions of the conventional theory based on rational agents.  
Other empirical evidence from behavioral studies indicates that people engage in narrow framing 
of losses and gains (Barberis and Huang, 2001; Kahneman and Lovalo, 1993), which may create an obstacle 
to adoption of fuel-efficient and electric vehicles. In particular, monthly payments on fuel may be evaluated 
separately from spending on the price of purchasing a car, influencing consumers’ choice of a car’s fuel 
type and its efficiency. To illustrate, many car owners in urban areas would be financially better off by 
selling their car and using a combination of taxis and rented cars (Thaler, 1999). However, paying a fee to 
take a taxi is mentally linked to spending on consumption, which consumers prefer to avoid. Instead, 
monthly cars payments are categorized as a different type of expense. Similarly, consumers may evaluate 
the cost of purchasing a car against a different budget than future payments on fuel. This would disfavor 
more expensive cars that generate fuel savings over time, such as electric vehicles. 
From another angle, we look at the impact of the diffusion of renewable energy in electricity 
production on the price of electricity, and subsequently on the rate of adoption of electric vehicles. So far, 
the impact of technological change in the electricity sector on the rate of adoption of electric vehicles has 
not achieved much scrutiny so far. To address this question, our model considers the impact of investments 
in renewable energy on the electricity price. In fact, research has been far from conclusive over short- and 
long- term impacts of the share of renewable energy in electricity production on the electricity price. 
Standard economic theory predicts that increasing its share may reduce the price of electricity in the short 
run, known as the merit-order effect (Jensen and Skytte, 2002). However, in the long run, the diffusion of 
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renewable energy has been typically financed by increasing the final electricity price paid by consumers 
(Moreno et al., 2012). The proposed framework captures these two opposing effects on the electricity price.  
We assume that technological change on the electricity market occurs through the installation of 
power plants embodying different energy technologies, following Safarzynska (2012) and Safarzynska and 
van den Bergh (2011, 2017). Formally, the electricity market is composed of heterogeneous power plants 
producing electricity from diverse energy sources. Plants, which reached the maximum lifespan, leave the 
market, and are replaced by new power stations. The size and the fuel type embodied in a newly installed 
power station is determined by the discounted value of investments in different energy technologies. We 
find that replacing fossil fuels in electricity generation by renewable energy around 2050 may triple the 
electricity price, undermining the positive effect of subsidies for the purchase of electric cars on their 
adoption rate. The intensity of this effect of subsidies depends on the particular behavioral model of car 
choice employed. The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview 
of the model and discuss its empirical validation. This is followed by results in Section 3. Finally, Section 
4 concludes. 
 
2. The model and its empirical validation 
The model links car and electricity markets. Section 2.1 studies the rate of adoption of electric and fuel-
efficient conventional cars in alternative behavioral models. We focus on consumers, who are fully-rational, 
myopic, loss-averse, and habit following. Formally, we incorporate these distinct behaviors into a discrete 
choice model. In Section 2.2, we examine how rational, habit-oriented and loss-averse consumers adjust 
their driving to changes in fuel prices so as to estimate the total emissions from car transport. The demand 
for electric cars is driven by their price and the cost of electricity, which in turn depends on the dynamics 
on the electricity market as described in Section 2.3. 
 
2.1. Behavioral models of car choice   
In the market for cars, n vehicle designs compete for adoption by m consumers. Each period, a number m 
of new consumers enter the market, to which will refer as a cohort l . Vehicle designs differ with respect to 
fuel type f (f=petrol (p), diesel (d), electric (e), hybrid (h)), and their fuel economy FCkt 
1or electricity 
efficiency zwhk (Wh/km). Formally, we consider four discrete behavioral choice models, where consumer 
i selects the product k which maximizes the behavioral (beh) utility: ),( , kktktikt
beh PXU  , with ktkt PX ,  and 
k  denoting observed product characteristics, vehicle price and unobservable characteristics, respectively.  
                                                   
1 FC is expressed in terms of (L/100km) if },{ dpf  . 
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In the first model, we assume that rational consumers choose a car design that maximizes their 
utility:  
ikkfktktkikt
rational DPGU   21 )ln( ,        (1) 
where ktG captures the discounted fuel cost; fD is a dummy equal to 1 for electric and hybrid cars; ik
captures unobserved consumer-specific taste parameters; and k can be thought of as the mean of 
unobserved product characteristics.  











       (2) 
where r is the discount rate; T is the expected ownership time; xjkt is expected distances commuted annually 
by each car owner (km); and ktfc captures the unit fuel efficiency, i.e. the amount of fuel (liters) in case of 
conventional cars, or the number of KWh of electricity, required to drive 1 km.  
In equation (2), ft
ep  captures consumers’ expectations regarding the price of fuel f at time t, which 




e pp 1 .        (3) 
 Given empirical evidence that consumers undervalue fuel prices compared to the price of a vehicle 
(e.g. Allcott and Wozny, 2014), in the second model we assume that consumers are myopic in this sense, 
and evaluate the discounted fuel cost and the vehicle price separately from one another:   
ikkfktktkikt
myopic DPGU   321 )ln()ln( ,       (4)  
Instead of minimizing the discounted cost of car ownership, consumers may compare alternative car 
specifications on an attribute-to-attribute basis to other, aiming at minimizing a weighted average of 
attribute differences between cars (e.g. Rasouli and Timmermans, 2016). Moreover, empirical evidence 
suggests that consumers are likely to frame differently losses and gains, and prefer avoiding losses to 
acquiring equivalent gains, which has been referred in the literature as loss aversion (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). In view of this, in the third model we assume loss-averse consumers who chose a car design 
based on: 
  ikkfktktktktkikt
averseloss DabsPposPabsGposGU   54321  (5) 
According to equation (5), consumers compare k design with a selected car design j. Here, ktposG
captures the difference in the discounted costs between k and j designs if the difference is positive, and 
ktabsG captures the absolute value of such a difference, if it is negative. Analogously, ktposP and ktabsP  
measure respectively positive and absolute negative difference in car prices between k and j’s designs. To 
6 
 
illustrate with an example, if the discounted fuel cost associated with car design k exceeds that of design j, 
then the difference in costs between these designs, ktposG , will be a source of disutility from buying design 
k. To reflect the latter
2  will be negative. On the other hand, if the discounted fuel cost of design k is lower 
than that of design j, the difference in costs will be negative. The absolute value of this difference absGkt 
will be a source of utility, thus 
1 >0. The absolute value of 2 exceeding 1 will capture risk aversion, 
indicating that people are more concerned with losses than gains, which we will examine empirically in the 
next section.  
Finally, consumers’ purchasing choice and driving behavior often show a sign of inertia. For 
instance, individuals have a strong predisposition to choose a car, whose attributes are similar to the one 
which they own currently (Hoen and Geurs, 2011). This can be conceptualized as habit-oriented consumers 
maximizing the utility: 
ikktfktktkikt
habitual DSDpGU   13321 )ln()ln(   (6) 
where consumers’ utility depends on whether they purchased a particular model in the past. To capture this, 
DSkt-1 takes value 1 if a consumer bought the k
th design in the past and 0 otherwise.  
We consider a sufficiently larger number of consumers, which allows us to approximate market 



















 ,     (7) 
where Ubehkt captures the utility derived by consumers from purchasing design k, in different behavioral 
models beh={rational, myopic, loss-averse, habitual}.  
 
2.1.2 Empirical validation    
To predict future vehicle adoptions, we estimate parameters in the utility functions (1,4-6) using the EU 
registration data of newly registered cars between 2010 and 2015 in Germany2. According to the EC 
regulation (no 443/2009), all EU member states are required to record information for each new passenger 
car registered in its territory, including: manufacturer name, type, variant, version, commercial name, 
specific emissions of CO2, mass of the vehicle, fuel type etc. We estimate coefficients in the utility 
functions using a subset of the registration data, including 341 car designs by 32 manufacturers in Germany, 
whose sales either exceeded 2k cars in 2010, or embodied an electric or hybrid engine regardless of the 
number of  such cars sold. 
                                                   
2 Downloaded at http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/co2-cars-emission-11 
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 As equations (1, 4-6) describe utilities of individual consumers, to estimate parameters in the utility 
functions based on the aggregate registration data, we aggregate discrete choice models of individual 
consumer behaviors to derive total demand for each car, following Berry’s (1994, 1995) methodology. In 
particular, we estimate parameters in the transformed equations: 
  1))(()ln()ln( jikjtktjkjtktkt XXmsms   ,   (8) 
where subscript j corresponds to a selected car design, to which we compare historical market shares (ms) 
and characteristics (X) of design k. We selected FIAT 500 as a reference model, as its sales in each year 
where close to the median. Subsequently, for each behavioral model, we estimate parameters in the 
transformed equations corresponding to utilities in (1, 4-6) respectively:  
For the rational-agent model: 
121 )())ln()(ln()ln()ln( jikfjfkjtjtktktkjkjtkt DDPGPGmsms    , (8a) 



























 . (8c) 
Finally, in the last behavioral model, we assume that sales of cars show path-dependency. To 
account for this, we include dsjt-1 as a dependent variable, which is the sum of market shares over different 
fuel versions of design k at time t-1. Formally, the regression has the form of:  
















The EU registration database does not include car prices. Subsequently, we collected data on the 
price of each car design in 2010 or 2011 (depending on the availability) from the Autoviva website with 
the exception to hybrid and electric cars, whose prices were collected from the press releases and 
manufacturers’ websites. We impute (diesel and petrol) car prices in the missing years according to a 
formula:  
                 )1(1 gktkt gPP   ,  for },{ dpf     (9) 
where g is the growth rate of prices, and g is a random variable. To estimate the annual grow of car prices, 
we collected prices of 80 car (petrol and gasoline) designs in 2006 from the EU annual report on car prices’ 
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comparison between EU countries, and compared them to prices in 20103. On average, between 2006 and 
2010 cars’ prices grew by 19.4% (±21%). This implies an annual price increase equal to g=4.5%, while we 
set g  to be drawn from N(0,0.05). We kept prices of electric and hybrid cars constant.  Prices of electricity 
and fuels between 2010 and 2015 were collected from Eurostat.  
The EU registration data includes data on efficiency of electric and hybrid cars zwh=(Wh/km), but 
not on fuel economy of conventional cars. We compute fuel efficiency of diesel and petrol cars, using data 
on CO2 emissions ekgjt (kg per km) reported for each car, following Ligterink et al. (2016):   
a
ekg
FC ktkt  ,      for },{ dpf    (11) 
where a=23.7 if car is fueled by petrol, and a=26.5 in case of diesel cars. 
To calculate the discounted fuel cost in equation (2), we assume the discount rate equal to 0.069, 
as estimated by Allcott and Wozny (2014). In case of hybrid vehicles, we estimate the discounted fuel costs 
based on costs in 50% of electric and 50% of petrol vehicles. 
Table 1 reports estimates of coefficients in different behavioral utility functions. In particular, it 
summarizes the results from the panel regression models with fixed-effects and AR(1) disturbances. This 
is motivated by the fact that we find that the data suffers from autocorrelation (F(1,322)=337.55), thus we 
included AR(1) disturbances to correct for this problem. In turn, the Hausman test indicates that the model 
with fixed effects is favorable over the model with random effects. Models 3 and 6 present the results from 
regressions with random effects, as the fixed-effect model does not allow to examine the impact of time 
invariant variables. However, in the out-of-the sample predictions (see Section 2.1.3), we use results from 
the fixed-effect models.  
The results in Table 1 support that consumers undervalue expenses on fuel compared to the vehicle 
price. In particular, we find that the coefficient corresponding to the vehicle price is six time larger than the 
coefficient corresponding to the discounted fuel cost in Model 3, confirming the myopia of consumers.4 
Moreover, the discounted fuel cost is statistically insignificant in explaining the probability that consumers 
purchase a specific car design (Models 2 and 3). In turn, the results from the model of loss-averse consumers 
indicate that the discounted fuel cost matters, but only if it is larger than the fuel cost of the comparison 
design (Models 4 and 5). In favor of this, the coefficient corresponding to the positive difference in the 
                                                   
3 The last issue was issued in 2006.  
4 The difference in coefficients between the discussed variables exceeds estimates from the preceding studies. This 
can be explained by the fact that we include in our database electric and hybrid vehicles, which has not been done 
before. Moreover, our estimations do not account for the endogeneity of car prices. Because of a lack of data, we had 
to impute values of vehicle prices based on historical patterns, thus our data do not account for how they change 




discounted fuel costs between k and j designs has a negative and statistically significant impact on the 
probability of adoption of k design. 
Similarity, the coefficient corresponding to the positive difference between the vehicle price of k 
and j designs has a negative and statistically significant impact on the shares of k design, indicating that 
more expensive cars have a lower probability of being purchased. In turn, the opposite does not hold. We 
find that the absolute negative difference between vehicle prices, or between discounted fuel costs (of k and 
j  designs) have an insignificant impact on market shares of design k (with the exception to the difference 
in the discounted fuel cost in Model 5). This suggests that more expensive options are less likely to be 
bought, but less expensive products are evaluated against other criteria than financial expenses by decision 
makers. Finally, the results from Model 6 indicate that past sales have a statistically significant and positive 
impact on future car sales, supporting that consumer inertia and habits play a role in explaining car 
























Table 1. Determinants behind demand for different car designs in alternative behavioral models. The results 
from panel regressions, with the dependent variable: ln(sjt)-ln(s0t), with AR(1) disturbances.  
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Note: standard deviations in parenthesis; *** indicates variables significant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent 
level, and * at the 10 percent level 
 
 
2.1.3 Out-of-the sample predictions     
We simulate the evolution of market shares of different car designs after 2015 as follows. For each 
behavioral model, we first compute the mean utility from purchasing design k kt
beh  (compared to the 
outside good normalized to zero) as: 
1)
ˆ)(( jikjktjkkt
beh XX   ,      (9) 
where the utility kt
beh  is computed numerically using product characteristics X as specified in equations 
(8a-d) and parameters reported in Table 1 for each behavioral model. As comparison values for design j 
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jX̂ , we use in our calculations mean characteristics over 2010-2015 of FIAT 500
5. Subsequently, we 

















6    (10) 
We assume a cohort of m=3 million consumers entering the market at each time t7. The cohort 
leaves the market after TL=10 years, which is the average lifetime of newly purchased cars in Germany 
(Kalinowska and Kuhfeld, 2006). The distribution of newly purchased car designs changes over time 
(between cohorts) because of changes in fuel prices as well as improvements in fuel efficiencies of different 
vehicles. We keep the price of vehicles constant after 2015 equal to their historical values. In model 
simulations, the prices of fuels (gasoline and petrol) follow random walk: fftft pp 1 ,with variable
f being drawn from N(0,0.14) for },{ dpf  and N(0,0.01) for electric cars. Here, 0.14 and 0.01 are 
standard deviations of gasoline and electricity prices between 2010 and 2015 in Germany, estimated using 
data from the Eurostat, respectively. 
 The evolution of fuel economies of different designs is essential for assessing future emissions. We 
assume that fuel efficiencies improve over time according to the equation:  
)1(1 FCFCktkt gFCFC     if   FCjt≥3  (11a) 
3ftFC  
8                otherwise  (11b) 
The growth of fuel efficiency equals gFC=-0.04 for diesel and gFC=-0.03 for petrol cars to match 
improvements in mean fuel efficiency observed in the data, whereas FC is a random variable drawn from 
N(0,0.01)9. Figures 1(a) and (b) compare distributions of fuel efficiencies in 2010 and 2015 registered in 
Germany of petrol and diesel cars respectively, based on which we forecast changes in fuel efficiencies 
after 2015. The figures illustrate that between 2010 and 2015, mean fuel efficiency of diesel cars improved, 
i.e. it fell from 5.67 to 4.87 L/100km. In case of petrol cars, mean values of fuel efficiencies were in 2010 
and 2015 respectively 7.22 and 6.01 L/(100km). 
 
                                                   
5 The mean value of the market share of the petrol version of the FIAT 500 was equal to 0.01 between 2010 and 2015, 
the mean value of the logarithm of vehicle price was equals to 9.47, and the mean value of the discounted fuel costs 
was 8.98. 
6 mskt is a market share of car design k in the dataset between 2010-2015, which is used to estimate parameters in the 
utility functions. In turn, d(
kt ) is the simulated market share after 2015.  
7 The number of new drivers each year is important for the assessment of total emissions from car transport.  
8 We assume that fuel efficiency cannot fall below 3 in model simulations, which constitutes a maximum efficiency 
frontier in our simulations 
9 To compute annual rates of improvements in fuel efficiencies gFC, we solved equations for petrol and diesel car 













(a) Fuel efficiency of petrol cars    (b) Fuel efficiency of diesel cars 
Figure 1.The distributions of fuel efficiencies of cars registered in Germany in 2010 and 2015 
 
2.2 Behavioral models of driving behavior  
Total emissions from car transport rely not only on the car choice and its fuel efficiency, but also how 
drivers modify distances travelled depending on changes in fuel prices. We consider three types of car 
driving behavior: with (1) rational; (2) habit-following; and (3) loss-averse drivers. In particular, we assume 
that rational agents, owners of car design k, maximize indirect utility, which is a function modified from 
Holland et al. (2016): 
)(max , ktkxykt xfyV        (12) 













xf  is utility from kilometers xkt travelled, and fckt is the unit fuel efficiency (petrol, 
gasoline or electricity) expressed in terms of litters of fuel needed per 1 km; I is annual income and y are 
other annual expenses. According to equation (12), consumers maximize the utility from driving and from 













xf  into the maximization problem (12) and then solving for xkt, gives the 









x       (13)10 
                                                   





where, fckl is fuel efficiency of car design k, which was purchased by consumers from the cohort l. We 
follow the methodology proposed in Holland et al. (2016) to estimate parameter akT. In particular, we 
substitute γ=2, which gives the elasticity for kilometers equal 5.01 

, and xkt=13500km, which is the 
expected annual distance driven in Germany by an average driver (Kalinowska and Kuhfeld, 2006), and 
insert these values into equation 13 to derive akT. The parameter value differs between owners of alternative 
designs because of differences in their fuel efficiencies. In addition, the parameter varies between car 
owners of the same design, but coming from different cohorts, as new cars entering the market are 
characterized by improved fuel efficiencies.  
 A second behavioral model of driving behaviour is habit formation, where current utility depends 
on a “habit stock” formed by past values of distances travelled. The basic idea here is that consumers dislike 
changes to their consumption levels, in particular changes in kilometers traveled each year. This model has 
not been used yet for forecasting demand for travel despite empirical studies indicating that habits affect 
consumers’ response to changes in fuel costs. For instance, Frondel and Vance (2013) find that households 
react to the increases in fuel price by reducing driving, and maintain the new behaviours even when prices 
fall to their original levels.  
Formally, the utility function can be modified to account for the impact of habits on utility 
















xu ,     (14) 
where σ measures the importance of habits hkt. Their evolves according to )( ktktkt hxh  
 , where the 
habit stock is the weighted average of past kilometers driven, with the parameter ρ describing the relative 
weights attached to distances commuted at different times. After substituting function (14) into 













)(  ,    (15). 
where parameter akT is the same as in case of rational consumers. In model simulations, we assume the 
strength of habits σ=0.5, and weights attached to the past travel distances to be equal to ρ=0.1. 
 A third model of driving behaviour reflects loss aversion on the side of consumers (Ahrens et al., 
2017). The basic idea here, which is line with prospect theory, is that consumers perceive utility losses from 
reductions in commuted distances differently than the perceived utility gains from an increase in distances 
travelled. The previous results show that changes in, and volatility of, gasoline prices affect the elasticity 
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of demand for gasoline (Lin and Prince, 2013). We model it formally here in a way that the elasticity of 
demand for kilometers ( )/1  changes over time depending on prior distances travelled. In particular, the 











  if     1ktx ≠ ktx  ,  (16) 
1 ktkt    otherwise. 
We assume that kt cannot fall below its minimum value min (=1.75) as well as it cannot exceed its 
maximum value of max (=2.2), while we set β=0.025. As a result, the elasticity of demand decreases if a 
consumer drove more at time t compared to the previous period. In turn, if she commuted less compared to 
the prior distance, her elasticity of demand for kilometers would increase, and subsequently she will 
commute more in the future period. This is motivated by the experimental evidence that a prior loss induces 
a risk seeking behavior (Kahneman and Tverskym 1979).  
 
2.3 The electricity market (electricity production) 
On the electricity market, production of electricity is carried out in heterogeneous plants i characterized by 
age sit,, specific productivity νit and energy source j, installed capacity ki, maximum lifespan
11 Tj, and 
capacity factor λj. The latter captures periods of decreased production due to economic reasons (low 
profitability), obligatory maintenance, etc. Initially, the market is composed of coal, gas, nuclear, biomass, 
wind and solar to reflect the diversity mix of fuels in electricity generation in Germany at the beginning of 
2010 (EU, 2013).12 We ignore in model simulations oil, hydropower and geothermal energy, which shares 
are negligible in electricity production.  
The structure of dynamics on the electricity market is as follows. At the beginning of each year t, 
plants set their production qit (given the capacity constraint qit  < λi ki) so as to maximize profits:  
ititititetit Fqmqp        (17) 
pet is the spot market price determined by a static demand function (below), mit is a marginal cost of plant 
i, and Fit represents its fixed cost. The fixed cost fix costs capture costs of electricity production which 
plants incur regardless of the levels of their production  
The electricity price is determined by an inverse demand function:  
    tet Dap             (18) 
                                                   
11 The maximum lifetimes of plants operating at time 0 were drawn randomly from the uniform distribution over the 
range (10, 50). 
12 In particular, we assume that: 35% of electricity is generated from coal, 11% from gas, 29 % from nuclear, 22% 
from biomass, 2% from wind and 1% from solar power stations.  
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where demand Dt is equal to a total supply: 
i
ittt qQD , and a and b are parameters. θ is a random 
variable drawn from normal distribution N(0,1). Consequently, E(θ)=0. 
The production decision by electricity plants is modeled as a Cournot game (Allaz, 1992; Allaz and 





















.      (19) 
Here, nt is the number of power plants operating at time t. Mt is a sum of marginal costs of all power plants 
operating at time t.  
A plant exits once sit>Tj where Tj is the expected lifetime of a plant (defined for each energy 
technology. If the owner decides to close the plant, he loses its production capacity forever (Atkeson and 
Kehoe, 2007). 
After setting production and their forward positions, plants decide how many inputs for production 
to employ so as to minimize total input costs. Electricity production by plant i using technology j is 









 ,      (20) 
where ait is the plant’s specific productivity; iKi*, iLi*, iFi* describe capital, labour and fuel input respectively. 
αKj, αLj αFj are corresponding substitution factors associated with technology j, where αKj+αLj+αFj=1.  






( , where vit is a thermal efficiency with which a plant can 
transform fuel into heat (energy). The thermal efficiency, which is a measure of plants’ productivity, can 
improve over time. Before each period, a random shock is drawn from the technology-specific distribution 
εi~N(μi,σ
2
i). A plant starts operating in the next period with a productivity equal to vit+1=vit+εt. This captures 
learning-by-doing: the longer the plant exists in the market the more efficiently it transforms basic energy 
inputs into electricity.  












































 ,     (21) 
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where pKt, pLjt, and pFjt and the prices of capital, labour and fuel j at time t respectively. We assume that the 
price of labour is equal to unity. This is a simplification, which allows us to examine impacts of relative 
changes in the price of fuel to labour on model dynamics.  
Prices of fuels change over time. In particular, fuel prices follow a geometric Brownian motion 
(Brand and Kinlay, 2007): 
tjjFjt dZdtdp    ,               (22) 
where σ is the volatility of fuel price j, Zt is a Wiener process and χ is a drift.   





















             
(23) 
where poj is the operating cost of technology j. 
In the beginning of each period, a new power plant enters the market. Formally, a planner evaluates 





































.             (24)13 
Here, Ij is a fixed cost per KW of installed capacity kij capturing initial investment costs and 
maintenance expenses. These costs need to be covered from the revenues over the entire life of the plant Tj. 
Furthermore, tsj indicates the number of years before plant i (embodying technology j) can be 
operationalized, jtm̂  is the expected marginal cost associated with technology j at time t+1 (best frontier 
technology), and r is an interest rate. A new plant starts operating in t+tsj. It embodies technology j that 
ensures the highest value Vij.  
 An optimal level of installed capacity kij equals (derived from  
𝜕𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑘𝑖𝑗


















,                (25) 




                                                   
13 This has been derived under the assumption that a plant can produce 8760 λi ki MWh electricity per year.   
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2.3.1. Empirical validation of the electricity market 
The parameters describing different energy technologies, such as gas, coal, nuclear, biomass, wind and 
solar energy, are calibrated on data for the electricity industry in the Germany between 2010-2015 − as 
summarized in Table 2. The data on costs and technical characteristics of energy technologies in Germany 
are collected from Kost et al. (2013). The data on operating costs and load capacities are equal to OECD-
mean values from IEA (2010). Finally, we have not found reliable data on the operating cost and the 
installation cost of nuclear power plants in Germany, and thus we assumed specific values from the realistic 
value ranges. In addition, we set realistic values regarding mean growth rate in thermal efficiencies. In turn, 
mean values and standard deviations in fuel prices were estimated based on data from FSO (2017) between 
2008 and 2016. The elasticities of substitution between factors in production for coal, gas and nuclear 
energy are based on Safarzynska and van den Bergh (2011). For other renewable energy technologies, we 




Table 2. Basic features of energy technologies 
Energy 
technology i 
Description coal nuclear gas biomass wind solar 
αk Elasticities of  




0.876 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.8 
αl 0.077 
 
0.035 0.07 0.2 0.2 0.2 
αe 0.471 0.089 0.73 - - - 
vi0 Initial thermal efficiency  45% 33% 60% - - - 
max vit Maximum thermal efficiency 55% 33% 70% - - - 
χ -0.5σj2 Mean value of changes in fuel 
prices 
 
-0.03 - -0.06 - - - 
σj Standard deviations of changes in 
fuel prices 
 
0.09 - 0.09 - - - 
pj0 Initial price of fuel  (E/kWh)14 0.011 0.006 0.029 - - - 
Tj Maximum lifespan 40 60 30 20 20 25 
poj Operating cost (E/kWh) 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.028 0.025 0.036 
Fjt Fixed cost (E/kW) 34 100 22 175 - 35 
tsj Construction time 4 7 2 1 1 1 
Ij Initial investment cost (E/kW) 1175 1200 550 3000 220015 1100 
λj Capacity factor  85% 85% 85% 85% 33%15 11% 




                                                   
14 We impose boundary conditions on fuel prices (0.005, 1).  




4. Results from the model simulations  
In this section, we study the impact of policies aimed at reducing CO2 emissions from the household 
passenger transport sector, and we compare their effectiveness depending on consumer’s buying and 
driving behavior. The calculations of the total emissions from the transport sector include a part of 
emissions from electricity generation, namely due to production of electricity used to fuel electric cars. We 
study total transport emissions for four distinct behavioural models of vehicle adoption: (1) rational  (AR), 
(2) myopic (AM), (3) habitual (AH), and (4) loss-averse consumers (AL). This is combined with three 
behavioral models of use or demand for kilometers, namely: (1) rational (DR), (2) habitual (DH), and (3) 
loss-averse drivers (DL). In total, our design gives rise to 12 different combinations of behavioral models 
of car choice and driving. It constitutes the first study, which compares systematically how different types 
of boundedly-rational behaviors affect emissions from car transport.  





..1 ..1   ,   (26) 
where m is the number of new cars entering the German market annually, ekglkt is the emission factor 
measuring kg of CO2 per km associated with design k bought at time l, xiklt is the distance travelled by 
owners of design k from cohort l at time t, and finally mslk is the share of k design in cohort l. In case of 
electric vehicles, the emission factor is equal to CO2 emissions per kWh of electricity produced multiplied 
by the electricity efficiency of design k from cohort l. The emission factor associated with production of 
electricity changes over times, depending on the fuel mix in electricity production.  
 We consider two energy scenarios, which differ with respect to energy mixes in electricity 
generation, so as to compare the impact on increasing the share of renewable energy in electricity 
production on the electricity price and the rate of adoption of electric cars. In the 2010 scenario, we assume 
that current energy mix is extrapolated into the future. Formally, the choice of fuel to be embodied in a new 
power plant is chosen randomly with the probability equal to the historical share of different fuels in 
electricity generation in Germany in 2010. In the second scenario, to which we will refer as the 2050 
scenario, we study the impact of abandoning coal and nuclear energy, and replacing them by renewable 
energy, on the electricity price. Formally, we model this as fuels to be embodied in new power plants being 
chosen with the probability equal to their projected shares in electricity generation in 2050 (see Figure 3 
and Appendix A). Typically, the existing studies compare emissions from car sector projecting the current 


















Figure 2. Actual and projected shares of electricity produced in Germany in 2010 and 2050, by fuel (Source: 
EU, 2013) 
 
 Additionally, we compare the rate of adoption of electric cars in three subsidy scenarios: (1) with 
no subsidy; (2) with the “€5000 subsidy” scenario, where consumers receive €5000 for the purchase of an 
electric vehicle, which is equal to the current value of the subsidy in Germany; and (3) “the optimal 
subsidy”, where the subsidy is calculated according to the formula, modified from Holland et al. (2016): 
xs etctt ˆ*)(
*   ,      (27) 
where x̂  is the expected distance commuted over the vehicle lifetime (135 000 km); and etct   captures 
the difference in marginal damages between the conventional and electric vehicles. Formally, ct and et
are the costs of CO2 emissions associated with driving one km of an average conventional and electric car 
at time t, which are calculated as: tsccct ekgP *  and tsccet zwhP , where sccP is the social cost of 
carbon (€ per kg of CO2 emissions); tekg  are mean emissions from driving 1 km by conventional cars 
present on the market at time t; and tzwh denotes mean emissions per km from driving electric cars, which 
depends on the fuel mix in the electricity sector.  
 
 
4.1. The total emissions from car transport under different behavioral assumptions 
Table 3 summarizes mean annual emissions from car transport over 50 years from 100 simulations for each 




factors (see Tables B.1.-B.6. in Appendix B). Each time step is interpreted as a year. The results in Table 3 
indicate that the rational model of adoption combined with the rational model of driving predicts the lowest 
emissions from car transport regardless of the energy scenario. In turn, the forecasts from the model with 
habit-oriented consumers (of car choice and driving) are the least optimistic. This can be explained by the 
fact that habitual consumers buy the least fuel efficient cars (see Section 4.). In addition, they commute 
more than other types of drivers. Whereas all commuters increase the demand for travel after fuel prices 
drop, habitual consumers take the longest to reduce their demand after the fuel prices increase again, overall 

















Model of  
driving* 
 DH DL DR AH DL DR DH DL DR DH DL DR 
scenario 2010 41.25 37.67 37.83 44.89 41.03 41.05 44.66 40.02 40.10 47.56 44.38 44.21 
scenario 2050 41.63 37.38 37.75 44.53 40.90 40.50 43.92 40.40 39.90 48.01 43.75 43.53 



































































































































* Note: DH- habitual drivers; DL – loss averse drivers; DR – rational drivers  
 
To examine if differences in mean annual emissions between different behavioral models and 
energy scenarios are statistically significant from each other, we run three OLS regressions with the 
dependent variable equal to mean total emissions (mean values from 100 simulations) with no constant, 
and including as independent variables dummies corresponding to different energy scenarios in the first 
regression; dummies corresponding to different models of car choice in the second regression; and dummies 
corresponding to different models of driving in the third regression. Subsequently, after each regression, 
we test if coefficients corresponding to different dummies are significantly different from each other. 
We find that there are no statistically significant differences in total CO2 emissions between 
alternative energy scenarios. This can be explained by the fact that the adoption of electric cars, even in the 
presence of subsidies for the purchase of electric vehicles, is low, and thus energy scenarios have a 
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negligible impact on total emissions (see Section 4.2). On the other hand, there are substantial and 
statistically significant differences in total emissions between models with rational and habitual drivers (DR 
and DH models; F(1,69)=32.40). There is no statistically significant difference in total emissions between 
loss-averse and rational drivers (F(1,69)=0.93). The former effect can be explained by the higher demand 















Figure 3. Mean annual distances travelled by the owners of conventional cars in different behavioral models 
of driving   
 
In addition, we study if there are statistically significant differences in the total emissions from car 
transport depending on the model of vehicle adoption. The results from regressions support that emissions 
in the rational model are statistically significantly lower compared to all other behavioral models of vehicle 
adoption. In particular, the emissions from car transport with fully rational agents are statistically significant 
lower compared to the model with myopic consumers (p<0.001; F(1,68)=17.29); and to the model with 
loss-oriented consumers (p<0.001, F(1,68)=26.96). Myopic and loss-oriented agents undervalue future 
energy savings from purchasing more efficient cars, and as a result choose sub-optimal car designs. In turn, 
the results indicate that the model with habit-oriented consumers (regardless of the type of driving behavior) 
generate the highest emissions, statistically significantly larger compared to the model with rational 
consumers (p<0.001, (F,1,68)=101.98). This is because habitual consumers purchase the least fuel efficient 
cars, as their choice is less sensitive to technical parameters of different vehicle designs (their price and fuel 







4.2. The diffusion of electric cars 
Table 4 summarizes the rate of adoption of electric cars depending on the subsidy for their purchase, the 
behavioral model of vehicle adoption, and energy mix in electricity generation. The results in the table 
indicate that our model generates a realistic adoption rate of electric cars equal to 1% in the 2010 energy 
scenario in the absence of subsidies for car purchase. The rate of adoption of electric vehicles increases 
here up to 6%, if agents are fully rational and receive € 500016 subsidy. In turn, in the 2050 scenario, a high 
price of electricity due to a rapid diffusion of renewable energy in the electricity production causes the € 
5000 subsidy to be ineffective in stimulating the diffusion of electric cars. This can be explained by the fact 
that the price of electricity is about three times higher in the 2050 energy scenario compared to the 2010 
energy scenario (see Appendix C for more details). Simultaneously, the unit emissions from the electricity 
sector felt from 0.16 kg of CO2 per kWh in the 2010 scenario to 0.05 kg of CO2 per kWh in the 2050 
scenario. 
Figure 4(a) illustrates the percentage difference between the rate of adoption of electric cars in 
distinct behavioral models compared to the rate of adoption of electric cars by rational consumers in the 
absence of subsidy and under 2010 scenario. The figure illustrate that consumers react differently to 
subsidies depending on the behavioral model of vehicle adoption. In general, the subsidy is the most 
effective in the model with habit-oriented consumers compared to other behavioral models, regardless of 
the type of energy and subsidy scenario. This is because many established brands introduce electric variants 
of their popular vehicle designs, which increases the chance of them being adopted by consumers. In our 
model, habit-oriented consumers are the most sensitive to brand considerations.  
Moreover, our analysis indicates that the optimal subsidy does not affect the adoption rate of 
electric cars significantly, yet generates a very high cost for public finance (Figure 4(b)). This is because 
the optimal subsidy is insufficient to alter decisions of consumers. According to our estimates, the optimal 
subsidy equals to € 625 under the 2010 energy mix, and to € 721 in the 2050 scenario. As electricity become 
less emission-intensive, the difference in marginal damages between driving the conventional and electric 
vehicles increases, translating into a higher subsidy. The value of subsidy is also sensitive to the value of 
social cost of carbon. We use sccP equal to € 45 per ton of CO2 (0.045 €/kg of CO2 emissions) in our 
calculations (CE Delft, 2010). This is similar to the SCC value of $ 40 per ton of CO2 used by Holland et 
al (2016). They find that the second-best electric vehicle purchase subsidy ranges from $ 2785 in California 
                                                   
16 “Germany considers $5,500 incentive for electric cars”. Reuters. Automotive News Europe. online 2016-




to -  $ 4964 in North Dakota, depending on the local energy mix in electricity production. It should be noted 
that the exact value of the SCC has been debated (Pindyck, 2013). Our study indicates that low values of 
the SCC may result in policies that are ineffective in terms of increasing significantly the adoption rate of 
electric cars and reducing carbon emissions, yet which are costly to implement. We run additional 
simulations with the sccP  equal to €125 per ton of CO2 , based on a recent meta-estimate of a lower bound 
to the SCC (van den Bergh and Botzen, 2014). The results from these additional simulation runs are 
included in Table 4 and Figures 4(a) and (b). Increasing the price of carbon from € 45 to € 125 raises the 
mean value of the subsidy from € 625 to € 1737 in the 2010 energy scenario and from  € 721 to € 2002 in 
the 2050 energy scenario. In turn, the adoption rate of electric vehicles increases slightly by 0.3% between 
the scenarios with the optimal subsidy equal to € 45 and € 125, at an additional cost of € 33 million for 
public finance (Figure 4(b)).  
 
 
                         Table 4. The mean share of adoption of electric cars– means from 100 simulations  
 













scenario 2010 0,025 0,017 0,024 0,033 
scenario 2050 0,013 0,019 0,018 0,035 
scenario 2010 + optimal subsidy 
Pscc=€45 0,028 0,018 0,025 0,033 
scenario 2050 + optimal subsidy 
Pscc=€45 0,014 0,020 0,019 0,036 
scenario 2010 + optimal subsidy 
Pscc=€125 0,032 0,021 0,028 0,035 
scenario 2050 + optimal subsidy 
Pscc=€125 0,017 0,024 0,022 0,038 
scenario 2010 + subsidy 5000 0,061 0,028 0,041 0,041 








Figure 4(a). The percentage difference between the rate of adoption of electric cars in different behavioral 























4.3 The rebound effects under different behavioral models  
Interest has risen in recent years about the impact of bounded rationality on energy savings (e.g. Gillingham 
et al., 2009). It has been long recognised that policy measures, implemented with the aim of encouraging 
energy savings in production and consumption, can generate results opposite to those expected. This 
phenomenon is known as the rebound effect (e.g. Brookers, 2000; Sorrel, 2007). The effect goes back to 
Jevons (1865), who suggests that improvements in the efficiency of coal-fired steam engines would result 
in more coal consumption, ultimately offsetting the benefits from increased efficiency. Depending on the 
study, the precise estimates regarding the rebound effect in the automobile sector range from 0 to 89 percent. 
However, current estimates are closer to 10-30% (US EPA, 2011).  
Typically, the rebound effect in relation to car use is the intensity effect, measured as the negative 
of the elasticity of driving with respect to fuel cost per unit distance, also referred to as the price-elasticity 
of vehicle miles of travel (VMT) (see Greene, 1992; Graham and Glaister, 2004; Brons et al., 2008). Thus, 
two factors have an impact on the magnitude of the rebound effect: improvements in fuel efficiencies and 
changes in fuel prices. To account for this, Small and Van Dender (2007) examine the magnitude of the 
rebound effect in a model, where VMT, vehicle ownership, and fuel efficiency are simultaneously 
determined. The authors find that the rebound effect increases with fuel cost. Similarly, the findings from 
Hymel and Small (2014) study indicate that the rebound effect is much greater in magnitude in years when 
gasoline prices are rising than when they are falling. Although a topic for a separate study, rebound might 
also be assessed by including the embodied energy of cars (in production). The reason is that it possibly 
differs considerably among types of cars, including on average between gasoline and electric vehicles. 
In this paper, we take a different approach and we examine the impact of different types of bounded 
rationality on the rebound effect. As our model accounts for the changes in fuel prices, which evolve 
according to the random walk, and improvements in fuel efficiencies of different car designs, which are 
determined exogenously by car manufacturers, it allows for a detailed analysis of how different types of 
behavioural models influence the probability of the rebound effect. Table 5(a) presents results from 8 panel 
regression models using our simulation data. We pooled data from 20 simulations for each of 12 behavioural 
models.17 The depended variable in Models 1-4 is the logarithm of mean distance travelled by owners of 
diesel cars at time t; while in Models 5-8, the dependent variable is the logarithm of mean distance travelled 
by owners of petrol cars at time t. As independent variables, we added the log of mean fuel economy of 
petrol cars at time t on the market and the logarithm of price of petrol in Models 5-8; and the log of mean 
fuel economy of diesel cars at time t on the market and the logarithm of price of diesel fuel in Models 1-4. 
As fuel economy FC is expressed in our model in terms of L/100km, we converted this measure into 
                                                   
17 We pooled results from 20 instead of 1 simulations for each model, because of the presence of stochastic factors. 
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2000/FC, so it is expressed as a distance driven per 20 km (km/20L). We conducted the analysis using the 
pooled data from all scenarios, as well as on a subset of data from specific models of driving behavior (DR, 
DL, DH) separately. The reported results come from the fixed-effects panel model. This is motivated by 
the fact that Hausman test indicates that the fixed-effects model is preferable over random-effect regressions 
(Chi2=144.66 for petrol and Chi2=77.43 for diesel). Moreover, we introduce AR(1) disturbances to control 
for serial correlation. In particular, the Wooldridge test indicates that our data suffers from this problem18.  
 The results from Table 4(a) indicate that the magnitude of the rebound effect equals to 4% in case 
of petrol cars, which is close to the value of 3% as estimated by Greene (2012) for the U.S. economy 
between 1967-2009 (Model 5). A different picture emerges from the study of diesel cars. The rebound 
effect constitutes here 7% (Model 1). The effect is statistically significant if consumers are rational or loss 
averse, but not in the model with habit-oriented drivers.  
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Note: standard deviations in parenthesis; *** indicates variables significant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent 
level, and * at the 10 percent level 
 
Figure 4(b) reports results from panel regressions conducted in an analogous way to estimations 
reported in Table 5(a), but with additional variables controlling for the model of car choice, i.e. with AH, 
AL and AM dummies. The AH, AL and AM dummies take a value, which is equal to 1, if shares of car 
designs were updated according to the model with habitual, loss-averse or myopic consumers, respectively. 
                                                   
18 The results of the Wooldridge test indicate that F(1,239)=235.31 in case of regressions for petrol cars, and 
F(1,239)=237.65 in case of ‘diesel’ regressions. 
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This is motivated by the fact that fuel economies of newly purchased cars vary between alternative 
behavioural models. Figures 5(a) and 5(b) illustrate mean FC of petrol and diesel cars over time from 600 
model19 depending on the behavioural models of vehicle adoption. The figure illustrates that myopic and 
loss averse agents adopt less fuel-efficient vehicles than rational agents, as they undervalue expenses on 
fuel over the vehicle lifetime, with habitual consumers choosing the least fuel-efficient cars. After 
controlling for car choice in the analysis, we find that the results in Table 5(a) overestimate the rebound 
effect for rational and loss averse consumers, which drops to 2-5% after controlling for the car choice. 
However, in case of the habitual drivers, ignoring car choice leads to the underestimation of the rebound 
effect. In particular, in the DH model, the rebound effect reaches 14 and 20 percent for owners of diesel 
and petrol cars, respectively. Interestingly, these values are in line with estimates from Small and van Denter 
(2007), who estimate the long-run rebound effect to be equal to 22.2% respectively, after accounting for 
the choice of fuel efficiencies in their analysis.  
 
Table 5(b). The probability of the rebound effect after controlling for the behavioral model of car choice; 
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Note: standard deviations in parenthesis; *** indicates variables significant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent 
level, and * at the 10 percent level 
 
 
                                                   














(a) Mean FC of petrol cars on the market                          (b) Mean FC of diesel cars on the market 
Figure 5. Mean fuel-efficiency of conventional cars in different behavioral models of car adoption 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
In this paper, we provide a systematic comparison of how incorporating realistic behaviors of car purchase 
and driving affects the life-cycle assessment of emissions from electric and conventional cars. The 
approached used combines four  elements: an econometric analysis of fuel economies of new cars in 
Germany between 2010-2015; a life-cycle analysis of emissions from conventional and electric cars; 
discrete choice models of vehicle adoption and driving that incorporate realistic behaviors; and modelling 
of the electricity sector. We adopt this approach to study the rebound effect. In particular, we examine how 
improvements in fuel efficiency of new cars affect CO2 emissions under different behavioral models. 
 Current estimates of emissions from car transport are based on the rational model of behavior, 
ignoring complexities of consumer choices. This is surprising as a variety of behavioral anomalies have 
been identified in the literature to affect car buying choice and driving behavior. In this context, the question 
arises how different types of bounded rationality affect decisions in the automobile sector. Addressing it is 
important for designing effective policies aimed at promoting fuel-efficient and electric cars. Against this 
background, we provide a systematic comparison of how incorporating different realistic behaviors into the 
assessment of future emissions from electric and conventional cars will affect their estimates. We consider 
four behavioral models of car choice (rational, myopic, loss-averse and habitual consumers) in combination 
with three models of driving (rational, loss-averse and habitual drivers). We show that rational models of 
vehicle choice and driving generate consistently the lowest estimates of future emissions from car transport. 




addition, we find that the probability of the rebound effect varies between different behavioral models of 
car choice and driving, with the probability of the rebound effect being the highest if drivers are habitual. 
In general, habit-oriented drivers do not react optimally to changes in fuel prices, commuting on average 
larger distances and generating higher emissions than rational consumers. On the other hand, myopic and 
loss-averse individuals buy less fuel-efficient cars, compared to the rational consumers, which also 
increases emissions from car transport. 
Our study is also motivated by the fact that the emission reduction from the electrification of car 
transport depends on the energy mix in electricity production. There are concerns that the transition in the 
electricity sector will drive the price of electricity up, which may undermine the diffusion of electric cars. 
In this context, we study how different policies aimed at promoting renewable energy affect the price of 
electricity, and the adoption of electric vehicles. In our model, technological change on the electricity 
market occurs through the installation of power plants embodying different energy technologies. We find 
that replacing fossil fuels in electricity generation by renewable energy by 2050 may triple the electricity 
price, undermining the positive effect of subsidies on the adoption of electric cars. The effectiveness of 
subsidies moreover varies between different behavioral models of car choice. All in all, our study suggests 
that incorporating realistic behaviors into policy analysis is important as it generates distinct and more 
accurate policy prescriptions than assuming rational consumers and drivers. It opens venues for future 
empirical analysis so as to examine the strength of different behavioral anomalies in car mobility.  
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Table A1. The probability of each fuel to be embodied in a newly installed power plants  
type of fuel the baseline scenario the 2050 scenario 
coal 0.4 0.75 
gas 0.1025 0.055 
nuclear 0.275 0 
biomass 0.21 0.5 
wind 0.025 0.25 
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Appendix C. The cost of financing the transition to a low-carbon economy 
The electrification of transport is considered as a viable option to mitigate impacts of climate change. The 
benefits can be only realized if the deployment of electric cars is combined with the diffusion of renewable 
energy in the electricity sector. Such intertwined transitions create a challenge for the grid integration, a 
discussion which is beyond the scope of this paper (Eising et al. 2014). Instead, we consider the impact of 
a rapid diffusion of renewable energy on the price of electricity and the rate of adoption of electric vehicles. 
So far, the impact of diffusion of renewable energy on the electricity price has been a source of the 
controversy. In general, it is expected that adding renewable energy technologies, characterized by a low 
marginal cost, to electricity production will lower the price of electricity in the short-run (Jensen and Skytte, 
2002). But in the long-run, increasing investments in renewable installed capacities is often financed by 
increasing the final electricity price paid to consumers (Moreno et al., 2012). Our model captures these two 
opposing effects: in the short run, increasing the share of renewable energy lowers the electricity price, 
because more electricity is produced with technologies characterized by lower marginal costs. However, as 
a result of lower electricity prices, the newly installed power plants become smaller in size as the size of 
newly installed power plants is determined by their future expected profits given the current price of 
electricity. Less installed capacity translates into less electricity produced, and thus a higher electricity 
price.  
In this context, the question arises how higher electricity prices would affect the rate of adoption 
of electric vehicles. We find that on average the cost of electricity in the 2050 energy scenario is three times 
higher compared to 2010 scenario (Figure C1(a)). This has been accompanied by the reduction of emissions 
from the electricity sector from 0.16 kg of CO2 per kWh to 0.05 because of increasing the share of 
renewable energy rapidly in electricity generation under the 2050 scenario (see Appendix B for the 
distribution of different energy sources in the electricity generation under different energy scenarios). Yet, 
this came at the price of quadrupling annual expenses in installed capacity of power plants between 2010 























(a) Emission factors from electricity generation            (b) Annual investments in electricity sector 
 
 
(b) The cost of electricity            
                                      
Figure C1. The electricity market (mean values over 100 simulations) 
 
  
 
